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ABSTRACT

The document examines the evolution of kibbutzim in Israel. The author suggests that a primary factor in the kibbutz development is the nature and structure of Israeli modernization efforts. The efforts encompass national ideology, industrialization, and legitimization of certain forms of social interaction. This mode of modernization stands in opposition to kibbutz utopian ideology and kibbutz socialist-communal efforts. However, as the State moves along the Western-modernization continuum, the kibbutz movement does not possess the autonomy, national power, or commitment to move in an alternative direction. For example, the national military role of the kibbutz challenges the community's need for peace and long-range security. Also, the delicate balance between individualism and mass culture has increasingly given way to norms of individualism and mass culture. The study indicates that small-scale socialist experiments cannot creatively grow within a larger opposing culture without undermining their ideology. Thus, a new perspective concerned with the problem of integrating local interests with global concerns is needed. (Author/KC)

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THE KIBBUTZ IN THE 1970's : FROM UTOPIA TOWARDS MODERNIZATION

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THE KIBBUTZ IN THE 1970's:
FROM UTOPIA TOWARDS MODERNIZATION

> It is provided that in the essence of things that from any fruition of success no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary.
>
> -- Walt Whitman

We live today in a world where the need for constructive utopian vision is acute. A utopian vision indicates possibilities for a different mode of life, of different norms of interpersonal relations and of human organization than the prevailing structures permit. The structural systems which frame the lives of the majority of the world's populations continue patterns of domination and reproduce forms of repressive.

As a critical survey of capitalist social structure brings forth increasing images of crisis and decline, the models offered by the USSR and other state-socialist countries do not provide the basis for great hope. The lack of utopian thinking and experimentation is a fundamental contemporary issue.

It is a moment in human history when inventions of a new social order are strongly required. We are not just discussing mechanical inventions of a technical nature but rather social inventions which nourish non-alienating labor, reduction and equal distribution of routinized work, and opportunities for individual and collective energies. Moreover, such social inventions will need to redefine our relationship with Mother Earth so we can act as caretakers and not rulers.

It is within this quest for a new economic and political order that the kibbutz presents a continuum of promising options, clear limitations, various contradictions and numerous unanswered problems. The case-study of Kibbutz Har documents the formation and evolution of social structures (e.g., job-rotation, the general assembly, and communal child care) that allow practical experimentation of utopian values. *

Har's history also demonstrates the constraints placed on the development of these social inventions by nation-state policies, the forces of industrialization, and emerging internal norms of materialism in the place of a socialist-communal ethos. Community tensions between Westernized models of development and socialism, between industrialization and agrarianism, between urbanism and ruralism, between social responsibility and individual desires, raised serious questions regarding the future viability of specific inventions as well as the general kibbutz experience.

The kibbutz has been an important social experiment just as much for its limitations and peculiarities as for its successes and general utopian characteristics. As opposed to most "utopias," particularly those in nineteenth-century America, the kibbutz was nation-oriented and not retreatist. From its beginning, the kibbutz planted seeds for various national military, political and economic institutions. Its web of relationships, linking the local to the national, immediately caused difficulties concerning kibbutz autonomy and "isomorphism" to the external structure.[1] What concerns us

* This article is the concludingchapter of the book, Community and Nation: The Evolution of the Kibbutz, Princeton university Press, forthcoming, which is based on a case-study of Kibbutz Har.

here is the nature of social change for the kibbutz -- what is unique and what has a larger connotation.

I. UTOPIAN IDEOLOGY

The utopian visions of individuals as Proudhon, Landauer, A.D. Gordon and Buber were evident in early kibbutz ideology and practice.[2] They defined a community organizational structure which was meant to encourage decentralization of power, a sense of mutual interdependence and opportunity for individual creation. Unlike many other "utopias," authority was shared, with no one person acting as guru or charismatic leader. Closer to a political movement than a religious rebellion, however, the kibbutzim recognized authority as vested in national political-military institutions.

Kibbutz community structure attempted to foster individual superego without suppressing self-expression. This was of critical importance to the kibbutz ideological approach to the issue of socialist-communalism and individuality. Reflective of the thinking of Rousseau, there was effort to reconcile demands for comradeship with demands for individual freedom. To this end, a great trust was placed in human rationality, a vision of individuals as independent units. While the early economic conditions contributed to limiting the scope of individual privacy in the community, kibbutz ideology did not regard this need as unnatural. The educational philosophy of the kibbutz continually stressed the concept of self-reliance, for both the individual and the community. The pioneering

ethos furthered this theme in the socialization process.

The ideal form of interpersonal relations was defined by a proper sense of community service without intense emotional claims. This impersonal communalism became symbolized in the choice of the Sabra (cactus) image for Jews born in Israel---tough on the outside but sweet inside.

According to kibbutz ideology, individuals met social responsibilities through self-sacrifice to the common good, not through spontaneous abandonment of self to the group. Sanctioned kibbutz forms of sexuality were connected to this ideological resolution of the tension between communalism and individuality.[3] The self-loss and intensity attached to group sexuality existed only for a brief time, if at all, in kibbutzim. Puritanism, common to many socialist movements, was evident in the kibbutz experience.

The means of social control in the kibbutz reflected the voluntary character of community membership and the acceptance of a wide variety of individual personality types. Specific forms of control rested on the force of group solidarity and included mechanisms as verbal warnings, social avoidance and, in rare cases, expulsion. Nonviolent rather than violent means of conflict resolution constituted internal forms of control. These methods were consistent with the overall kibbutz stance towards integrating the communal with the individual.

The kibbutz during its first years attempted to realize a number of utopian socialist principles. Increasingly, in the last three decades, it has accepted modes of development

which lead towards more repressive forms of social organization. The present direction of kibbutz activity is primarily related to the history and character of Israeli nation-state development, particularly regarding industrialization. These external factors are coupled with internal community forces in bringing about shifts in kibbutz priorities and overall reality.

II. INTERNAL FORCES

The history of utopian-communalism suggests that ideological purity is consistently eroded by the creeping inroads of routinization, political confrontation and the practicalities of daily life. As this occurs, an ideological "letting-go" occurs, permitting shifts in priorities and methods of organizing internal structures. The passion of rebelling against the old order, of setting up new forms of behavior and interaction, is cooled by a settling into the emerging patterns that soon become well-worn. For kibbutzniks, the great pioneering adventure of literally breaking new ground, of establishing an entire new way of life provided fertile ground for deep ideological attachment. The vattikim of Har were able to synthesize the ideological promise of Socialist-Zionism with actual experience. They had the historical fortune to give birth to their visions.

The ideological "letting go" was perhaps inevitable for the second and subsequent generations.[4] The generation continuum is another issue generally encountered by utopian

communities. The children of the founding generation do not share the same synthesizing experiences as their elders and are more prone to see the emergent community as a given reality rather than an experiment. For them it is a status quo entity. The revolt of the first generation is missing from the second generation's lives. They can choose to either accept a perhaps interesting, but in any case, existing order, or turn outward for direction. In Har's case, we have seen that succeeding generations have tended to be much less ideological and are politically less active.

An analysis of the ethos of succeeding generations of the kibbutz leads to another conclusion: material success can generate ideological failure. During pre-State years, the kibbutz barely maintained a subsistence economy. Collective action was just as much a practical necessity as an ideological realization. A strong solidarity of purpose and action evolved from enforced simplicity. One example of the "failure of success" has been the changing pattern of communal interaction. At first, there was only one communal building and it housed the communal kitchen-dining hall. The kitchen became the recognized setting for sharing experiences and moreover, became the center for communal nurturing. This was structurally important for socialist organization, for it allowed social trust to be established and social responsibility to be incorporated into individual life. As material success afforded more buildings which provided more privacy, the settings for sharing and communal nurturing decreased. More rationalized

structures to insure collective encounters had to be formally arranged. These new forms have never been able to recreate the spontaneity and everyday promise of collective encounters of the earlier period.

The above three factors -- ideological "letting-go," the generation continuum, and the failure of material success -- are all internal forces constraining socialist communalism. These factors have been important not only to the future of the kibbutz movement, but also to other ideological movements in the past and present. They all exist, however, within the context of the larger societal setting. The principal theme throughout this study of the kibbutz has been the overall significance of the relationship between external national forces and local internal change. Internal factors of change have continually responded to the emerging forms of Israeli nationalism and industrialization.

III. EXTERNAL FORCES -- NATIONALISM

For the kibbutz movement, nationalism has been an instrumental force for both solidarity and disruption. While the kibbutz has been continuously attached to national activities, and received external economic, social and political support, socialist values and structures have been undermined by evolving national policies. Before the State's foundation, the kibbutz played a leading role in nation-building efforts. Pre-State nationalist activities by the kibbutz covered a wide range of

colonizing efforts, including land settlement, absorption of new immigrants, establishment of military outposts, learning of a common national language, and the initiation of a Jewish agrarian economy. Supported by the privately-financed structures of the Yishuv society (i.e., the Jewish Agency), these kibbutz activities also produced the foundations for a variety of public sector institutions that became important during the post-State era -- the Histadrut, the Hevrat Ovdim, the Workers Bank, etc.

The kibbutz involvement in pre-State nation-building proved to be somewhat of a complement to socialist-communal directions. Reverence for manual labor matched the material need of working new land settlements. Solidarity of the group was strengthened by the sense of military threat and the more positive ethic of a pioneer community. Even the spatial shape of the kibbutz -- the circular patterns around central communal buildings -- integrated a norm of cohesion with a practical response to the existent political environment. During this period, the kibbutz enjoyed an important degree of local autonomy as there was a relatively weak independent national infrastructure and legal-political jurisidction was still resting in the British Mandate system. The kibbutz was in a position of serving the national needs on its own terms, without being a servant of a state. It is, in fact, an institution of the pioneering elite.

With the establishment of the Israeli State, the relationship of the kibbutz towards the nation significantly altered. The powerful influence the kibbutz held as the central nation-

building institution was lessened. The vision of constituting the Israeli society as one general network of kibbutzim quickly withered away. In its place was the modern reality of small, local socialist communities existing within a nation-state oriented towards a Westernized model of development. The overall direction of Israeli political and economic policies became the critical factor in limiting socialist-communal possibilites. The national political structures incorporated centralist rather than decentralist forms and the national economy invited capitalist inroads and Western modes of technology and industrial organization.

The issue of the State has long been a problematic one for socialists and this has been true for kibbutzniks. On the one hand, the kibbutzniks emphasizing notions of self-sufficiency and class insularity, had little faith in the concept of the state. They felt central authority should be generally resisted and that workers should rely on their own resources and solidarity. Rather than assuming the liberal perception of the state -- as an expression of the general will -- kibbutzniks largely agreed that the state acted as the executive arm of the ruling class.

However, the kibbutz ideology of socialist-Zionism was inherently connected to the building of Jewish nationalism, in effect, to the building of a Jewish state. Though many kibbutzniks may have wished that the Jewish state be different from all other states, the signs were evident during the Yishuv period that this would not be the case.

The early kibbutz movement, as the rest of the Yishuv, was reliant on capitalization from the wealthier classes in the Diaspora and coordinated by the Zionist financial institutions. Unlike many recent socialist experiments, the land and labor for the kibbutz was not already available for development. The kibbutz labor was immigrant labor and the land had to be purchased. Immigrant labor and land purchase required substantial capital investment. The financers of Yishuv colonization were interested in Jewish nation-building and not in subsidizing socialist communities.

The Zionist goal of establishing a Jewish State began with the notion that Palestine was a land without a people. The kibbutz never emerged with a creative response of its own to the issue of an autonomous Palestinian population. By placing primary efforts into nation-building, the kibbutz was unable to develop communal networks which would have included the fellaheen. This is not to suggest that the fellaheen would have necessarily been open to such networks. But it remains the case that regional communal efforts were barely attempted. The consequence of the limits of kibbutz socialist-communalism on this issue have been consistent with the nation-state failure to reach overall regional accord and effect regional interdependence.

Finally, the kibbutz Yishuv experience defined not only future relations with the Palestinian population, but also the kibbutz movement's relationship with international affairs. During the pre-State years, nation-building priorities commanded

a great deal of individual and collective attention. Energy, time and interest increasingly was bounded by an internal rather than external perspective. National particularism rather than international universalism more and more shaped the socialist kibbutz vision. The pre-State function of the kibbutz as a military-base in geographically vulnerable areas furthered an inward sense of threat from the outside world. On a socio-psychological dimension, the impact of internal group solidarity defined by a militaristic pride, defined by death as much as life, continues to mark kibbutz confrontation with socialist movements and the larger world in general.

The post-State era furthered the gap between the direction of national development and socialist communalism. In the 1950's, the revelations concerning Stalin of Stalinism proved a severe blow to those looking for viable socialist models. The kibbutz movement suffered terrible splits and recriminations. Simultaneously, national patterns of immigration and capital flow shaped the economic environment of the kibbutz community.

The immigrant groups of the 1950's and 60's came to Israel at a very different moment in history than the kibbutz vattikim. Yishuv pioneering had given way to state modernization activity. National attention moved from building a rural Jewish peasantry to enlarging a skilled-urban industrial base. State policies resulted in a major occupational reshifting and resettlement of immigrant groups, and educational programs to bring the newcomers into the dominant Ashkanazi (European) culture.[5]

The incredible population increase from 800,000 in 1948 to over 3.3 million in 1975, was a politically and economically decisive factor for the kibbutz as for the rest of the nation. We have seen, in the study of Har, the ramifications of Ben-Gurion's call for the hiring of immigrant labor by kibbutzim. The Sephardic immigrants had to come to Israel more from a "push" from former home countries than from a "pull" towards establishing a new Utopia. Moreover, ideologically, they were highly suspicious of socialist endeavors and often were religiously orthodox. They were, therefore, generally uninterested in becoming kibbutz members, and often vehemently opposed to kibbutz perspectives.

The kibbutz movement had its own reservations concerning the Sephardic immigrants. The newcomers brought with them a different ideological and cultural tradition. Integration into the rather provincial world of the kibbutz was not a simple matter. Ashkanazi norms were already well-defined in the kibbutz so that when Sephardim did become members (approximately 7% of the total kibbutz population), they became "the second culture." The appearance of differentiated patterns of housing became a common social organization phenomenon.

Relations between the kibbutzim and Sephardim was even more strongly characterized by a "first" and "second" culture due to the reluctant acceptance by the movement to hire the immigrants as laborers. The fact of hired laborers in the agrarian and industrial sectors of the kibbutz raised ideological problems of a new dimension. For the kibbutz to become

an employer of wage labor was a serious violation of its socialist-communal values -- self-labor, classless society, and job-rotation.

From an ideological socialist position, the kibbutz would have resisted accepting Sephardim as hired laborers and instead pushed on the national level to create a classless Israeli society for all. Politically, however, the kibbutz had already accepted the direction of nation-state policy and economically succumbed to acting as employer. The decision to employ hired labor occurred before kibbutz industrialization had "taken-off." Originally, national priorities of employing new immigrants prevailed. Later, the expansion of industrialization exacerbated kibbutz internal labor needs.

Changes in national capitalization flow also were instrumental in shaping post-state kibbutz material success. In 1948, Israel was in the category of less developed country, or LDC. Per capita income was around $300.00 in 1950.[6] A high, long-term growth rate between 1950 and 1965 caused the nation's transition from "developing" to "developed." By 1970, per capita income was $1636.00, lower than most North American countries but higher than Italy ($1587) and close to Japan's ($1658). This was higher than any other Asian nation except Kuwait.

The steady large flow of capital has been the major cause of GNP growth in Israel. The sources of capital inflow distinguish Israel from the economic history of other LDC's. Major sources have been world Jewry, reparations from the

German government, and United States aid. The first two are not sources for other countries. Between 1949 and 1965, world Jewry contributed $3,558 million, the German government $1,787 million, and the U.S. government $737 million (German fixed reparation ended in 1965).[7]

Another distinguishing feature of Israeli growth economy was the character of its original labor force: of all pre-State immigrants, only 13% were unskilled and over 90% of the males were literate. In addition, the strong ethos of national identification encouraged positive work attitudes needed to build a new economy. There are few LDC's which begin with an equal labor endowment.

The kibbutz benefited directly from reparation payments, the increasing availability of state loans and grants, and the general national rise in production and consumption.[8] Its standard of living shifted from subsistence towards that of the urban middle class. During periods of recession and escalating inflation, the collectivized institutions of the kibbutz were better able to withstand the storms than the more vulnerable nuclear family units.

The aforementioned capital inflow resources provided Israel with economic advantages unusual for an LDC, and state policies became focused on achieving greater economic independence. To this end, economic policy was divided into the 1950 import substitution phase and the 1960 export expansion phase. Both phases occurred within a framework of modernization adopted from the West. Technology imported from the West was

the backbone of import substitution; export expansion was largely concerned with the market needs of North America and Europe. The kibbutz economy mirrored these stages through cash-crop farming and accelerating industrialization. By 1971, over 140 of 235 kibbutzim had industrial plants, employing over 25% of the kibbutz total labor force.

The Israeli national goal of greater economic independence, similar to that of most LDC's, has been continually limited by the state's military-political reality. In the pre-State period, the little manufacturing that did exist largely rested on supplying military hardware for the region rather than production for civilian use. By 1973, Israel ranked eighth in military expenditures among 132 nations of the world. The disproportionate percentage of the state's budget (35-40%) earmarked for military defense needs has contributed to the nation's serious inflation problem. Moreover, the defense budget greatly limits domestic social services: ranked eighth in military expenditure, Israel ranks 23 for infant mortality, 25 for public education expenditure and 43 in public health expenditure.[9] The state's military-political position, as well as its economic position, are linked to Western initiatives. Kibbutz transition, the constraints on socialist-communal directions, must be weighed from this context.

IV. EXTERNAL FORCES -- INDUSTRIALIZATION

The imperatives of the Western model of industrialization, including the market needs of its military-defense production, caused fundamental change in the social structure of the kibbutz. The history of the origin and expansion of Har's factory presented evidence of increased internal stratification, specialization, loss of job-rotation and less opportunity for influencing the work environment. The division of women and men into the service and wage-producing sectors respectively was strengthened. Knowledge concerning overall community activity and plant operations became less shared among the membership, allowing more power concentration and less possibility for participatory democracy. The General Assembly attendance records of Har document this transition.

While this is not the place for an intensive discourse on the nature of Western models of industrialization, the kibbutz experience raises questions concerning industrialism which deserve further future study: Are developing countries necessarily tied to the prevailing Western industrial model? Is a socialist-agrarian ideology, such as that of the kibbutz, inevitably doomed because of the requirements of the international market? In other words, does socialism today require industrialization and if so, in what form?

From its inception, the kibbutz was closely linked to nation-building efforts and it never was in a position to determine independently the nature and scope of its economic development. The kibbutz attachment to agrarian-socialism and

to possible non-Western models of industrialism did not exist on a national policy level. The State not only accepted that the international market demanded a certain scale of industrialization, but also that Israel's primary market ties were in the West. In terms of national political and social organization, the kibbutz never had the power (and strength of ideological commitment) to direct State economic policy along a socialist path.

Israel followed a direction common to most LDC's. It at first pushed for import substitution programs. The State's decision, through the Department of Defense, to allow special grants and loans to Har for the renewal of its factory reflected this policy. State military needs were, of course, another important consideration. The success of this economic phase was minimal but other State policies of full employment and population dispersal were attained.

For Har, as for many other kibbutzim, the import substitution program resulted in a "package-deal type" importation of the Western model of industrial organization.[10] The technology, scientific knowledge, marketing skills, and organizational format came from the outside. They imposed structures alien to the kibbutz ideology. In sociological terms, Geshellschaft norms pushed against those of the Gemeinschaft, the profane against the sacred, alienation against integration.

The 1950's industrialization of the kibbutz had significant effects on the meaning of work.[11] An irony was struck that as the community as a whole became more materially successful and

more leisure time was created, industrial organization limited a worker's sense of time and space. The imported industrial model demanded worker conformity to a particular pattern of time and space, lessening opportunity for self-definition. Close attachment to nature, direct manual experience with the means of production, individual pride in work were undermined as kibbutzniks became industrial laborers and managers. We have seen that the depth of the change touched all spheres of kibbutz life. The spirit of inventiveness, critical for future social experimentation, has been discouraged by the nature of kibbutz industrial organization.

The second stage of Israeli economic development, export expansion, increased scale of the kibbutz industrial effort. A general shift towards more skill-intensive goods was reflected in the boom cycle for Har's Metal Work Factory in the last decades. Growth of aircraft exports, including aircraft parts made by Har, were an important element in this shift.[12] During this period, the number of hired laborers dramatically increased. By 1970, Har had completely replaced kibbutzniks on the production floor by hiring over 100 hired laborers. A new managerial class of workers was constituted. The Weberian image of a world dominated by obedient professional managers and bureaucrats, which had been so far from the early kibbutz ideology or practice, came much closer to being rooted in kibbutz organization.

The success of the export expansion phase of national development rested on government policies which supported

company mergers and market concentration. Relaxation of tariff barriers, reintroduction of export premia in 1965, and consolidation of profitable product markets all created favorable conditions for growth of Har's factory and those of other kibbutzim. Centralization rather than decentralization became a principal concept of State economic development. A large expansion of the public sector bureaucracy supported the economic merger movement.

We turn back again to our questioning of the relationship between socialism and industrialism. Are there alternatives to the Western model adopted by Israel and given a home in the kibbutz? If we take a comparative view, it appears that while no model can be exactly replicated by another nation, there have been a number of socialist experiments relevant for the kibbutz. Principal examples include Cuba, Tanzania and until recently, China. All of these examples offer alternatives to the Soviet model and have retained, in vary degrees of success, a significant level of national autonomy.

The Tanzania model is particularly relevant to the Israeli kibbutz experience. Tanzania has attempted to utilize agrarian socialism as the backbone of development policies. When industrialization was introduced, great effort was made to avoid technology and work conditions that promote alienation and loss of community control.

Experimentation with a uniquely African form of national socialism continues under Julius Nyerere's direction in Tanzania. Ujamaa (literally meaning familyhood)-socialism is built on the

traditions of African tribal society.[13] In the Arusha Declaration of 1967, Nyerere stated that the foundation of Tanzanian development would be agriculture based in the Ujamaa villages. Values of self-reliance, social equality, a sense of an extended family nationhood, and an anti-exploitative economy are reminiscent of early kibbutz utopian ideology. Although the Tanzanian nation has fallen far short of its socialist goals, its attempt to pose a serious alternative to the Western development model is noteworthy.

The Tanzanian experiment provides support for the argument that industrialization, in itself, is not a cure for underdevelopment.[14] In fact, it can spark rather than eliminate unemployment and underemployment. The crisis of urban centers overpopulated with rural immigrants is part of this picture. Modernization which follows Westernized models also has sapped natural resources of the LDC's to benefit the wealthier nations, undermining national independence and local self-control. For Tanzania, for the kibbutz and for other socialist experiments, the scale, organization and products of an industrial effort are problems requiring solutions supportive of socialist goals. Nyerere has clearly stated:

> We want capital investment in Tanzania not because we like factories and think they improve the scenery . . . (but) because we want to improve the lives of the people of this country. . . . However good the conditions in a particular factory or industry, the workers cannot be isolated from the rest of society. We are committed to philosophy of African socialism and basic to this is the principle of human equality. One of our concerns, therefore, must be to prevent the growth of a class structure in our society.[15]

At issue is whether industrial and development models of organization can be produced which insure the greatest degree of material well-being, for the largest number of people in the context of egalitarian norms.

The problems of appropriate models of modernization and industrialization are coupled to whether social organization can develop which gives life to the utopian hope for a creative integration of collective and individual energies. Specific trends of kibbutz development shed light on the possibilities and obstacles facing future socialist experimentation. They also clarify what is unique and generalizable from kibbutz history:

-- While the kibbutz has continued an agrarian economic sector, it has moved from a self-sufficiency farming to a cash-crop farming. Today, for example, milk is pumped by machines from cows, sent, untouched by hands, by truck to a regional processing plant, returned by truck to the kibbutz, where, for a price it fills the common dispenser. The relationship to the land has not disappeared but fewer members work directly with nature. The Regional Milouot system furthers the rationalization and capitalization of the agrarian enterprise.

-- Industrialization has greatly furthered the existence of hired labor, caused greater division of labor and substituted exchange value for use values of work. A managerial and industrial bureaucratic form has come into the community's organization.

-- Military-political instability continues to pose an external threat. Pre-State illegal activity in the Yishuv defense force, has been replaced by high performance by kibbutzniks in the state's armed services.

-- Children of the kibbutz usually remain as kibbutz members; however, attraction to urban life has risen; in addition, the ability of the kibbutz to attract new members from the rest of Israel and abroad has decreased since the 1960's.

-- The family has taken on new significance. Children spend more time with parents; women push for more family privacy, partly in response to increasing dissatisfaction at work. The new strength of family ties reflects the sexual division of labor and the fact that while women became "masculinized" men were not "feminized."

-- Leadership is still rotated but among a small group. Authority remains in structure rather than in personality.

-- The kibbutz still controls its elementary and high school systems; educational philosophy has remained fairly consistent; however more youth wish to attend higher education not under kibbutz jurisdiction. More students are taking exams to enter outside institutions which results in a modification of kibbutz internal educational program.

-- The relationship between the individual and community has elements of both change and continuity. There is more practice of personal privacy; less communal time; less organice sense of communalism. But communal ritual and solidarity are still present, particularly in times of celebration and distress. Children are still placed in communal child care during the day; Sabbath and holidays are still collectively observed. Social control remains non-violent and membership remains voluntary. The greatest threat to the continuance of collective patterns of interaction appears to be the emerging individualism and materialist value system. The Sabra attitude remains.

CONCLUSIONS

The kibbutz has presented a wealth of experiences, of mistakes and achievements, from which to learn. What lessons can be drawn?

First, the kibbutz offers no blueprint for change. While communities can direct themselves to goals of socialist-communalism, no society is static and unchanging. Thus, a great challenge confronting socialist efforts is the ability to create working models from the given set of problems -- (e.g. class, ethnic, race divisions) -- within that society. Historical and comparative perspectives are critical for germinating

ideas but the concept of "The Model" to fit all socialist movements is not helpful, and, in the end, causes disillusionment.

Next, ideological movements do not exist by themselves but in the context of larger social forces. The direction of kibbutz social change has been shaped by both internal and external forces, acting interdependently and independently. It is fair to conclude from the evidence presented that a primary factor, if not the primary factor, in kibbutz development has been the nature and structure of Israeli modernization efforts. These modernization efforts encompass national ideology, industrialization, and legitimization of certain forms of social interaction. Modernization has always been equated with the West, mass culture and the death of individuality.

This mode of modernization stands in opposition to kibbutz utopian ideology and kibbutz socialist-communal practices. However, as we have seen, the kibbutz from its earliest days has been linked with nation-building and recognizing the authority of national institutions. As the State moved along the Western-modernization continuum, the kibbutz movement did not possess the degree of autonomy, national power, or commitment to press forward in an alternative direction. Individual kibbutzim have tended to substantially benefit from the general national material gains but at the cost of compromising important ideological positions. The study of the kibbutz indicates that small-scale socialist experiments cannot creatively grow or be sustained within a larger opposing culture without, at minimum, undermining their ideological thrust.

Finally, the kibbutz experience suggests that the success of socialist efforts depends on new modes of thinking as well as new forms of social organization. There was a tendency in the original formulations of kibbutz ideology to emphasize national identity at the expense of class unity. The arguments pitting national consciousness against class consciousness have not allowed an approach that builds constructive bridges between the two. The Tanzanian Ujamaa effort is a promising attempt in this regard. Socialist movements have to develop further new thinking on this issue.

New thinking is necessary on the problem of integrating local interests with global concerns. The kibbutz increasingly became linked to multinational institutions at the expense of losing a great degree of economic autonomy while gaining forms of industrial organization that undermined socialist-communalism.

The national military role of the kibbutz which has international ramifications has continually challenged the community's need for peace and long-range security. Fuller coordination of socialist-communal efforts on regional, national and international scale is needed.

The integration of individual needs with emerging political-social structures requires attention. In the kibbutz, the delicate balance between individuality and collectivity has increasingly given way to norms of individualism and mass culture. A central goal of socialist-communalism has been to allow full realization of individual potential in an environment of mutual and collective trust. The times we live in

gravely repress opportunity to achieve this goal. Yet, seeds for change in the kibbutz and elsewhere remain alive, if not flourishing. New ways of thinking are needed to make them bloom.

1. Rosabeth Kanter, Commitment and Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 153-54.

2. The following are among the best sources for understanding the throught of these utopian philosophers: Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); Eugene Lunn, The Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); George Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (London, 1956); and for A.D. Gordon, Samuel Kurland's Cooperative Palestine (New York: Sharon Books, 1947).

3. The recent works by Michel Foucault deserve careful attention by those concerned with issues of dominance: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York:

Pantheon, 1975) and The History of Sexuality, Volume I (New York: Pantheon, 1978). On a comparative note, members of kibbutzim, unlike members of many other communal movements, were not persecuted by the larger society.

4. Menachem Rosner, The Kibbutz as a Way of Life in Modern Society (Givat Haviva, 1970).

5. David Horowitz, The Economics of Israel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1967). Richard Pomfret, in Trade Policies and Industrialization in a Small Country (J.C.B. Mohr Tubingen, 1976), also describes the extent of urban-rural dispersal in Israel, p. 145.

6. Pomfret, op. cit., p. 3.

7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. The decision of what to do with reparations given to kibbutz members was left to each kibbutz to decide separately. In some kibbutzim the monies were pooled; others allowed individual recipients to keep private accounts.

9. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (Virginia: WMSE Publishers, 1976).

10. Uri Leviatan, "The Industiral Process in Israeli Kibbutzim: Problems and their Solutions," in Israel: Social Structure and Change, ed. by Curtis and Chertoff (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1973).

11. Attention on the structure and nature of work and work relations has been proliferating in recent years. Among the most important studies are Andre Gorz, ed., The Division of Labor (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1976); Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) and Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

12. Pomfret, op. cit., p. 69 notes the increase in aircraft and parts exports from Israel in recent years.

13. William Duggan and John Civille, Tanzania and Nyerere (New York: Orbis Books, 197[illegible]); Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London: Oxford Unive sity Press, 1967).

14. One supporter of th s view is Gunnar Myrdal. See his "Paths of Developments" in Peasants and Peasant Society, ed. by Teodor Shanin (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975).

15. Nyerere, op. cit., pp. 209-210.